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Abstract Dutta and Reichelstein (2010) study the role of transfer pricing and
organizational choice in providing incentives for efficient decisions on the acqui-
sition and subsequent reallocation of capacity within decentralized firms. Their
analysis suggests that transfer prices based on the historical cost of capacity facil-
itate the efficient allocation of resources. They also find that symmetric responsi-
bility center structures are generally better suited for providing efficient investment
incentives than hybrid organizations. An important condition for the derivation of
the two results is the linearity of the shadow prices of capacity. If shadow prices are
nonlinear, transfer prices should be below (above) the historical cost of capacity in
order to counteract the managers’ incentives to underinvest (overinvest). Because
profit center organizations can use transfer prices for mitigating the inefficiency
caused by nonlinear shadow prices, they offer a natural advantage over pure
investment center organizations in implementing efficient capacity decisions.
Overall, these observations suggest that the curvature of profit functions is an
important factor in determining the suitable instruments for decentralized capacity
management.
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1 Introduction
Sunil Dutta and Stefan Reichelstein (2010) (henceforth Dutta and Reichelstein)
propose a model of capacity management in decentralized firms. The objective of
their study is to identify robust mechanisms for implementing efficient decisions on
the acquisition and subsequent reallocation of capacity between two divisions of a
firm. The design variables for achieving this goal are the responsibility center
structure and the transfer pricing policy.
The model offers a rich and complex structure. It distinguishes three organiza-
tional forms and two transfer pricing regimes and analyzes their efficiency for two
capacity scenarios. The firm can either adopt a pure profit center structure, a pure
investment center structure, or a hybrid organizational form in which one of the
divisions is a profit center and the other becomes an investment center. The
distinguishing feature between the two responsibility center types is that only
investment centers have the right to acquire capacity. Transfer pricing becomes
relevant whenever one of the divisions is organized as a profit center. The transfer
pricing mechanism depends on the capacity type. Capacity can either be
‘‘dedicated’’ or ‘‘fungible’’. In both cases the divisions can secure a certain capacity
level at the beginning of each period but, only if capacity is fungible, the initial
capacity assignments can later be reallocated between the two divisions. In both
scenarios the initial transfer price per capacity unit is based on the historical
acquisition cost of capacity. However, if capacity is fungible, the divisions are free
to renegotiate the original agreement to their mutual advantage and adjust the
transfer payment accordingly.
The key messages of the paper are as follows. First, transfer prices based on the
historical cost of capacity can be a useful instrument for implementing efficient
capacity decisions in decentralized organizations. Second, symmetric responsibility
structures are generally better suited for providing efficient investment incentives
than hybrid organizational forms. These findings are certainly interesting and
relevant for the understanding of transfer pricing methods and the closely related
question of organizational design.
An important condition for the optimality of full cost transfer pricing is the
linearity of shadow prices in the fungible capacity scenario. Dutta and Reichelstein
identify this limitation and derive the optimal capacity benchmark for nonlinear
shadow prices. However, they do not formally analyze the consequences of this
restriction on the firm’s transfer pricing policy and the ranking of organizational
forms. My analysis suggests that it is generally better to use a transfer price that is
unrelated to the historical cost of capacity when shadow prices are nonlinear. Indeed,
the optimal transfer price is below (above) historical cost in order to counteract the
divisions’ incentives to underinvest (overinvest). Moreover, because transfer prices
are important for mitigating the inefficiency caused by nonlinear shadow prices,
profit center organizations offer a natural advantage over pure investment center
organizations in implementing efficient capacity decisions. I also demonstrate that
the additional degree of freedom in guiding the divisions’ capacity decision can even
make a hybrid organization more desirable than a pure investment center structure.
Overall, these observations suggest that assumptions about the curvature of profit
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functions can have an important impact on capacity planning decisions under
uncertainty and the transfer pricing problems related to them. This observation is an
important by-product of the Dutta and Reichelstein model. On the one hand it
significantly increases the complexity of transfer pricing models, but on the other
hand it offers fruitful directions for future research in the area of transfer pricing.
The remainder of this discussion is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
short summary of the model and its main results. Section 3 reviews the relation
between the Dutta and Reichelstein model and the existing literature in management
accounting. Section 4 contains a detailed discussion of important assumptions and
model limitations, and provides some suggestions for future research. Section 5
concludes the discussion with a short summary.
2 Summary of the model and its main results
2.1 Simplified model setup
In this section I explain the principal structure of the Dutta and Reichelstein model. I
use a reduced version of their multiperiod model with a single capacity decision and
a two-period planning horizon. This setup is convenient for the purpose of this
discussion and facilitates the comparison of the Dutta and Reichelstein model with
the existing literature. Consider a decentralized firm with a central office and N = 2
divisions. At the beginning of the planning horizon, the firm acquires b units of
capacity at a constant unit cost of v. Capacity has a useful life of T = 2 periods, but
it diminishes over time with a constant decay rate of g(b) = 1 - b [ [0, 1]. Hence,
the available capacities in periods 1 and 2 are k1 = b and k2 = b  b.
The revenue of division i in period t is measured by the strictly concave function
Rit = Ri(qit, eit). The variable qit denotes the actual amount of capacity allocated to
division i in period t, and eit is a period-and division-specific revenue shock. The
noise terms et:(e1t, e2t) are independent and uncorrelated over time. They
materialize at the end of period t after the capacity for that period has been fixed.1
Dutta and Reichelstein assume that the existing capacity is fully allocated to the two
divisions and that the divisions never carry excess capacity. Thus, it always holds
that q1t ? q2t = kt. From these assumptions, the expected total revenue in period t
can be expressed as MtðktÞ 
P
i
bRit; where bRit ¼ E Riðqit; eitÞ½  denotes the
expected revenue of division i in period t. Let c = (1 ? r)-1 denote the discount
factor for an interest rate of r, then the present value of the firm’s expected cash
flows evaluated at t = 0 equals
P0 ¼ c  M1ðbÞ þ c2  M2ðb  bÞ  v  b: ð1Þ
Drawing on recent work of Rogerson (2008), Dutta and Reichelstein show that the
multiperiod objective function in (1) can be decomposed into an intertemporally
1 Dutta and Reichelstein define a second random variable hit in determining Rit in order to motivate the
need for decentralized capacity planning. They assume that the two divisions jointly observe the
realizations of hit at the beginning of each period but that this information is not available to the firm’s
headquarters. I ignore this variable for ease of notation.
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separable sum of period profits, P0 ¼
P
t c
t  Pt; where the expected profit for
period t equals
Pt ¼ MtðktÞ  c  kt; and c ¼ vc þ c2  b : ð2Þ
Since c is a linear function of the historical capacity acquisition cost, it can be
interpreted as a period-related measure for the full cost per capacity unit.2 The
decomposition of the multiperiod objective function essentially allocates the his-
torical capacity acquisition cost to the two periods of the budgeting cycle. In fact,
the decomposition rule requires that v  b = c  (c  k1 ? c2  k2). After a rear-
rangement of terms, this identity can be taken to show that a share a of the historical
capacity acquisition cost v  b is allocated to the first period, and a share 1 - a is
allocated to the second period, where
a ¼ 1
1 þ c  b ¼
1 þ r
1 þ r þ b : ð3Þ
From the definition of the cost allocation rule in (3), the share of the first period is
decreasing in c and b, and increasing in r, respectively. Moreover, the period cost
measure c can equivalently be expressed as a linear function of the cost share,
namely, c = (a/c)  v.
Dutta and Reichelstein use this model framework to study the optimal acquisition
and allocation of capacity within the decentralized firm. As shown in Table 1, they
distinguish four scenarios that differ with respect to the degree of capacity
commitment, the firm’s organizational form and the transfer pricing scheme in
place.
Dutta and Reichelstein distinguish three organizational forms. They start with a
hybrid organization where division 1 acts as an investment center and division 2 is a
profit center. In this setting division 1 is responsible for the acquisition of the total
capacity required by the firm. Dutta and Reichelstein also study two pure
organizational forms: A profit center organization and an investment center
organization. In the profit center setting, the firm’s headquarters acquires the
Table 1 Overview of planning scenarios in Dutta and Reichelstein (2010)
Case Capacity type Organizational structure Transfer price Efficient
delegation
1 Dedicated Hybrid Full cost Yes
2 Fungible Hybrid Adjustable full cost (negotiated) No
3 Fungible Profit center Adjustable full cost (negotiated) Yes
4 Fungible Investment center Negotiated for reallocation of initial
capacity
Yes
2 In the context of the overlapping multiperiod planning problem in the Dutta and Reichelstein model,
the term c can be interpreted as a measure for the long-run incremental cost per capacity unit, see Dutta
and Reichelstein (2010).
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capacity for both divisions, whereas in the investment center setting each division
acquires its own capacity.
The capacity can either be dedicated or fungible. The hybrid organization is
studied for both capacity types, whereas the analysis of the pure organizational
forms assumes that capacity is fungible. The difference between the two scenarios is
depicted in Fig. 1 for the hybrid organization. In both cases division 2 first reserves
an initial capacity level k2t at the beginning of each period. Subsequently division 1
determines its own capacity requirement, aggregates the divisional capacity
demands, and acquires total capacity bt. If capacity is fungible, the two divisions
renegotiate a reallocation of the initially reserved capacity levels to their mutual
advantage after observing the period specific revenue shock vector et. Hence, kit =
qit in the fungible capacity scenario except for hairline cases. If capacity is
dedicated, the period specific revenue shock vector et is observed too late for
adjusting the initial capacity assignments, so that the divisions are forced to use the
initially reserved capacity levels for production, that is kit = qit.
For the dedicated capacity scenario, Dutta and Reichelstein consider a system of
transfer prices based on the historical acquisition cost of capacity. This full-cost
transfer price also serves as a starting point for the ‘‘adjustable full cost’’ transfer
pricing scheme in the fungible capacity scenarios 2 and 3. Here, the divisions order
their initial capacities at full cost but adjust the transfer payment during
renegotiations. For the investment center organization (case 4), there is initially
no need for transfer pricing, but the transfer payments for capacity reallocations are
determined through bilateral negotiations between the two divisions.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed organizational settings and
transfer pricing schemes, Dutta and Reichelstein focus on the notion of goal
congruence between headquarters and the two divisions. Managers are assumed to
make their capacity decisions in order to maximize their expected divisional
performance. A divisional performance measure is congruent with the objectives of
the firm whenever it motivates the division manager to maximize the firm’s
multiperiod objective function in (1). Strong goal congruence is achieved if both
managers have an incentive to maximize the multiperiod objective function of the
firm regardless of their own time preferences. Dutta and Reichelstein allow for
Fig. 1 Sequence of decisions and information flow in the fungible and the dedicated capacity scenario
for a hybrid organization
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arbitrary managerial time preferences. They assume that the manager of divison i
maximizes a weighted average
P
t uit  Pit of the expected period performances Pit;
where uit denotes a non-negative weight attached to the performance of period t.
2.2 Main results
Achieving strong goal congruence in a multiperiod transfer pricing problem is a
nontrivial exercise because it requires an efficient decomposition of the firm’s
multiperiod objective function into N 9 T independent divisional performance
measures. Thus, in contrast to a traditional single period transfer pricing problem, a
cross sectional disaggregation of the firm profit into N independent divisional profit
maximization problems is not sufficient for an efficient decentralization. In addition,
the multiperiod framework also requires the intertemporal independence between
the divisional performance measures over time. Nevertheless Dutta and Reichelstein
find that strong goal congruence can be attained for all organizational structures
under consideration except for the hybrid organization in the fungible capacity
scenario.
As noted above, the multiperiod objective function in (1) can be disaggregated
into T independent profit function at the firm level. Since q1t ? q2t = kt and
qit = kit, the firm’s total expected cash flow for the dedicated capacity scenario is
maximized if capacities are determined so that the expected marginal revenue of
division i in period t; bR0it; equals the full period cost per capacity unit:
bR0itðkitÞ ¼ c: ð4Þ
Let kit
d denote the capacity level that solves (4), then the efficient capacity level for
period t in the dedicated capacity scenario equals kdt ¼ kd1t þ kd2t: If division 2 is
organized as a profit center and division 1 acts as an investment center, the divi-
sional performance measures are given by the following expressions:
P2t ¼ bR2tðk2tÞ  p  k2t ð5Þ
P1t ¼ bR1tðk1tÞ þ p  k2t  c  ðk1t þ k2tÞ; ð6Þ
where p denotes the transfer price per capacity unit. It can be seen that the divisional
performance measures in (5) and (6) are maximized by the efficient capacity levels
kdit whenever the transfer price equals the full period cost of capacity, that is, if
p = c.
If capacity is fungible, the existing capacity can be reallocated between divisions
after the revenue shock vector et has materialized. The optimal amount of capacity
allocated to division i after renegotiation, qit  qitðkt; etÞ; is found by maximizing
the sum of the realized revenues subject to the condition that q1t ? q2t = kt. It is
implicitly defined by the following optimality condition
R0it q

it; eit
  ¼ kðkt; etÞ; i ¼ 1; 2: ð7Þ
R0itðÞ denotes marginal revenue, and k(kt, et) is the Lagrangian multiplier
measuring the shadow price of capacity for a given capacity stock kt and a given
realization of the random vector et. Substituting the optimally reallocated capacity
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levels into the divisional revenue functions yields a maximum revenue of Rit ¼
Riðqitðkt; etÞ; eitÞ for division i in period t and an ex ante expected maximum revenue
of bRit ¼ E Ri qitðkt; etÞ; eitð Þ½ : Let Mt ðktÞ 
P
i
bRit; then the present value of the
firm’s expected cash flow evaluated at t = 0 equals
P0 ¼ c  M1ðbÞ þ c2  M2ðb  bÞ  v  b: ð8Þ
As in the dedicated capacity scenario, the multiperiod objective function in (8) can
be decomposed into an intertemporally separable sum of period profits, P0 ¼P
t c
t  Pt ; where the expected profit for period t equals
Pt ¼ Mt ðktÞ  c  kt: ð9Þ
Since oMt ðktÞ=okt ¼ E kðkt; etÞ½  from the envelope theorem, the firm’s total
expected profit for the fungible capacity scenario in (8) is maximized if the fol-
lowing condition holds for all periods:
oPt =okt ¼ E kðkt; etÞ½   c ¼ 0: ð10Þ
Let kot denote the aggregate capacity level that solves (10) and let k
o
it be the efficient
capacity level for division i. A comparison of the optimality conditions for the
dedicated and the fungible capacity scenarios in (4) and (10) indicates that kot ¼ kdt
and koit ¼ kdit if and only if the following condition holds:
bR0itðkditÞ ¼ E kðkot ; etÞ
  8 i; t: ð11Þ
That is, the optimal capacities for the two alternative demand scenarios are identical
if the optimality condition for reallocating capacities after observing the noise term
vector et in (7) also holds in expectation. Dutta and Reichelstein implicitly employ
condition (11) for the main part of their paper by assuming that divisional revenues
and the shadow price k (kt, et) are linear functions of the random variables eit.
To illustrate the consequence of linear shadow prices, I consider an example with
quadratic revenue function Rit = (h ? ei)  qit - 0.5  qit2 and E[ei] = 0.3 With these
assumptions the expected marginal revenue in the dedicated capacity scenario equals
bR0itðkitÞ ¼ h  kit; so that kdit ¼ h  c from (4) and kdt ¼ 2  kdit by the symmetry of
divisional revenues. The solution in the fungible capacity scenario is derived in two
steps. First, reallocating a given total capacity of kt yields optimal capacity
assignments of qit ¼ 0:5  ðkt þ ei  ejÞ and a shadow price of k(kt, et) = h - 0.5 
(kt - e1 - e2). It can be seen that k (kt, et) is a linear function of e1 and e2. Second,
taking the expectation of the shadow price and applying condition (10) results in an
optimal capacity of kot ¼ 2  ðh  cÞ: It follows that kot ¼ kdt : Moreover, taking this
solution, the expected capacity assignments for the fungible capacity scenario become
E qit
  ¼ 0:5  kot ¼ kdit: That is, in expectation the same amount of capacity is allocated
to the two divisions under both scenarios. Finally, it can be seen that condition (11)
collapses to kit = 0.5  kt. This equation holds only if kit ¼ kdit:
For inducing the managers to replicate the optimal solution in the fungible
capacity scenario, Dutta and Reichelstein propose a negotiated transfer pricing
3 The quadratic revenue function of the example obtains, for example, if one assumes a linear inverse
demand function with additive noise: pit(qit) = h ? ei - 0.5  qit.
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scheme in the spirit of Edlin and Reichelstein (1995) and refer to this method as
adjustable full cost transfer pricing. The mechanism allocates the initial capacity
endowment at historical cost but after the divisions observe the realization of the
random vector et, they renegotiate the initial allocation by adjusting the originally
assigned amounts kit to the optimal capacity levels q

it: The resulting surplus is split
between the divisions through lump sum transfer payments in proportion to their
bargaining power di, where d1 = 1 - d2. Ex ante, the expected renegotiation
surplus equals SPtðktÞ ¼ Mt ðktÞ  MtðktÞ: A rational division manager correctly
anticipates the outcome of the renegotiation stage and accounts for it in making his
capacity decision. For a pure profit center organization, the performance measure of
division i in period t becomes
Pit ¼ bRitðkitÞ  p  kit þ di  SPtðktÞ: ð12Þ
Maximizing the expression in (12) with respect to kit and rearranging terms yields
the following first-order condition for division i in period t:
P0it ¼ oPt =okt  ðp  cÞ  ð1  diÞ  E kðkt; etÞ½   bR0itðkitÞ
 
¼ 0: ð13Þ
In each period the equilibrium capacities kt ¼ k1t; k2t
 
are obtained by solving the
pair of equilibrium conditions in (13) for k1t and k2t. Comparing the equilibrium
condition in (13) with the condition for the efficient capacity choice in (10) shows
that in equilibrium kit ¼ koit if the central office sets p = c and if condition (11)
holds. Thus, in a pure profit center organization, it is essential for an efficient
delegation of capacity planning that the transfer price is at full cost and that the
shadow prices are linear in et. Moreover, with linear shadow prices, this result is
independent of the divisions’ individual bargaining power because in equilibrium
the expected marginal return from reallocating the initial capacity levels,
E k kit þ kjt; et
 h i
 bR0it kit
 
; is zero. The same observations can be made for an
investment center organization, where the performance measure of division i
becomes
Pit ¼ bRitðkitÞ  c  kit þ di  SPtðktÞ: ð14Þ
However, since both divisions are responsible for acquiring their own capacity,
there is initially no need for transfer pricing. Both divisions will incorporate the
historical acquisition cost of capacity into their investment decision. A comparison
of the performance measures in the pure profit center and the pure investment center
settings in (12) and (14) shows that both divisions face identical decision problems
in every period whenever p = c. Thus, charging a profit center the full period cost
of capacity puts it into the position of an investment center.
It follows that the firm has two alternatives for achieving efficiency in the
fungible capacity scenario: a pure profit center organization and a pure investment
center organization. By contrast, the hybrid organization can cause problems in the
fungible capacity scenario because the manager of the downstream division may
have incentives to strategically distort his capacity demand. I will discuss this case
in detail in Sect. 4.2.
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3 Relation and contribution to the management accounting literature
3.1 Efficiency of full-cost-based (transfer) pricing decisions
The relevance of full cost for (transfer) pricing decisions is one of the most
fundamental issues in management accounting research. On the one hand it is a well
documented empirical fact that firms frequently use full-cost-based product and
transfer prices.4 On the other hand it is widely accepted in the management
accounting literature that full cost is not relevant for operating decisions. As a
matter of fact, the acquisition cost of capacity is only relevant for the procurement
decision but not for the subsequent decisions on the optimal use of the existing
capacity resources. These decisions should rather be guided by the current
opportunity cost of capacity at the time of the resource usage decision.
The apparent conflict between theory and practice has motivated a considerable
amount of research aiming to rationalize the use of full cost measures for product
and transfer pricing decisions. The recent transfer pricing literature has focused on
the role of full-cost-based transfer prices as a decision influencing device. For
example, one line of research proposes cost-based transfer prices for mitigating
adverse selection problems (Wagenhofer 1994; Vaysman 1996; Christensen and
Demski 1998). A second stream of research examines the usefulness of cost-based
transfer prices in providing incentives for specific investments at the divisional level
(Baldenius et al. 1999; Sahay 2003; Pfeiffer et al. 2008; Baldenius 2009). A third
group of articles studies the strategic role of transfer prices above marginal cost as a
commitment device vis-a-vis a competitor in a duopolistic product market (Alles
and Datar 1998, Go¨x 2000, Narayanan and Smith 2000).5
The structure of the capacity planning problem in the Dutta and Reichelstein
model is closely related to a strand of literature that examines the formal relation
between firms’ capacity planning and pricing decisions. The capacity planning and
pricing literature focuses on identifying conditions under which the historical cost of
capacity approximates the current opportunity cost without economic loss.6 The
starting point of the capacity planning and pricing literature is the model of Banker
and Hughes (1994). They consider a simultaneous capacity planning and pricing
problem of a multiproduct monopolist facing uncertain demand and find that pricing
and capacity decisions can efficiently be decomposed if capacity units are allocated
at the historical acquisition cost per capacity unit.7
4 See e.g. Govindarajan and Anthony (1983) and Shim and Sudit (1994) for evidence on the role of full
cost in product pricing. Horngren et al. (2005) provide a summary of international evidence on full-cost-
based transfer pricing.
5 See Go¨x and Schiller (2007) for a detailed survey of the economic transfer pricing literature and for
further references.
6 See Balakrishnan and Sivaramakrishnan (2002) for a survey of the capacity planning and pricing
literature.
7 Budde and Go¨x (1999) establish a similar result in the context of a procurement auction. Go¨x (2001)
considers a two-period version of the capacity planning and pricing model and identifies conditions under
which full cost pricing can serve as a suitable heuristic.
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Go¨x (2002) generalizes the model of Banker and Hughes (1994). He considers a
sequential capacity planning and pricing model that distinguishes three different
demand scenarios. As shown in Fig. 2, the firm sets capacity k at t = 1 and product
price m at t = 2. The demand function, q(m, e) = a - m ? e, is linear and contains
a noise term e with mean zero. The three demand scenarios vary in the time at which
the firm learns the realization of the noise term e. In the first scenario, the firm
observes e at the beginning of the budgeting cycle and decides under certainty on k
and m. In the second scenario, the firm learns e after choosing k and m, so that both
decisions are taken under uncertainty. Finally, in the third scenario, the firm learns e
after choosing k but before setting m. Go¨x (2002) refers to this third scenario as
‘‘partial uncertainty’’ because only the capacity decision is made under uncertainty,
whereas the pricing decision is taken under certainty.
Based on the analysis of the optimal capacity planning and pricing policies for
the three scenarios Go¨x (2002) shows that the differential availability of demand
information is crucial for determining the relevance of historical capacity cost for
pricing. In fact, whenever the firm has access to the same demand information at the
time of capacity planning and pricing, it factors the historical capacity cost into the
optimal pricing formula. This solution obtains under certainty and under uncertainty
but not under partial uncertainty. The intuition behind this result can best be
explained for the certainty scenario. Consider first the pricing decision for a given
capacity level k. Let R(m, e) = m  q(m, e) denote revenue and v the cost per
capacity unit. The firm maximizes total profit Pðm; kÞ ¼ Rðm; eÞ  v  k with respect
to m subject to the constraint that k C q(m, e). The optimal product price m* is
found by equating marginal revenue with the opportunity cost of capacity, measured
by the Lagrangian multiplier k (k, e). Since it cannot be rational to waste resources
under perfect foresight, the firm sets its capacity so that k = q(m*, e) and
k(k, e) = v. Hence, the optimal policy can be characterized by the following
condition:
R0ðm; eÞ ¼ kðk; eÞ ¼ v: ð15Þ
The first part of the optimality condition in (15) is equivalent to (7). The second part
suggests that, under certainty, the historical capacity acquisition cost incurred at
t = 1 is a perfect substitute for the opportunity cost of capacity determined on the
alternative dates for resolution of uncertainty
capacity acquisition capacity use/pricing
scenario 1:
certainty
scenario 3: 
uncertainty
scenario 2: 
partial uncertainty
t 1 2
Fig. 2 Sequence of decisions and information flow in the capacity planning and pricing model of Go¨x
(2002)
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basis of the demand information available at t = 2. It follows that the pricing
problem can be simplified by directly setting k = q(m, e) and maximizing the
unconstrained profit PðmÞ ¼ ðm  vÞ  qðm; eÞ with respect to m. A similar
argument can be made for the uncertainty scenario. Here, optimal capacity and
product price are found as the solution of a modified newsboy problem. As shown
by Banker and Hughes (1994), the optimal capacity equates the historical
acquisition cost with the expected opportunity cost of capacity. At the same time
the optimal price equates the expected opportunity cost of capacity with expected
marginal revenue. Taken together, both conditions imply that the optimal price can
be found independent of the optimal capacity by maximizing the modified profit
function E½PðmÞ ¼ ðm  vÞ  E½qðm; eÞ with respect to m.8 The sole difference
between the simplified profit functions in the certainty and uncertainty scenario
consists of replacing actual with expected revenue.
Unfortunately, such simplification cannot be made for the partial uncertainty
scenario. Here, the solution of the pricing problem is identical to the certainty
scenario. The optimal price is found by equating marginal revenue with the
opportunity cost of capacity. However, because k(k, e) is a function of e but capacity
is chosen before e is observed, the optimal capacity balances the historical
acquisition cost with the expected opportunity cost of capacity. Since E[k(k, e)] =
k(k, e), it is impossible to establish a functional relation between the historical
acquisition cost incurred at t = 1 and the opportunity cost determined at t = 2.
Accordingly, a pricing policy based on the historical cost of capacity fails to
maximize the firm’s profit.
The optimality conditions for capacity acquisition and pricing (capacity use) for
the uncertainty and the partial uncertainty scenario are summarized in Table 2. The
table compares the relevant scenarios of the capacity planning and pricing model
with the benchmark solutions for the two capacity scenarios in Dutta and
Reichelstein. A closer inspection of the decision sequences and information flows in
Figs. 1 and 2 suggests that the partial uncertainty scenario in the capacity planning
and pricing model has the same structure as the fungible capacity scenario in the
Dutta and Reichelstein model. In both models, the capacity is acquired before the
demand uncertainty resolves but capacity use is optimized afterwards. Likewise, in
both cases the optimal capacity is determined by equating the historical acquisition
cost with the expected opportunity cost of capacity, whereas the use of existing
capacity is optimized by equating marginal revenue with the actual opportunity cost
of capacity.
A similar observation can be made for the uncertainty and the dedicated capacity
scenario. Here, the decisions on capacity acquisition and capacity use are essentially
made before the demand uncertainty resolves. However, in the Dutta and
Reichelstein model the capacity usage decision is not explicitly modeled but
implicitly determined when the divisions decide on their initial capacity endow-
ments kit. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the optimality condition for pricing the
8 As shown by Go¨x (2002), the full separation of the pricing problem from the capacity planning problem
actually requires ‘‘soft’’ capacity constraints as assumed by Banker and Hughes (1994). With ‘‘hard’’
capacity constraints, the optimal price can still be characterized as full cost-based, but the optimal
solution for p and k must be determined simultaneously.
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condition determining the optimal capacity in the capacity planning and pricing
model is equivalent to the condition for the optimal capacity choice in the Dutta and
Reichelstein model. Namely, the historical acquisition cost must equal the expected
opportunity cost capacity.
Given these similarities, both models consistently recommend that optimal
decisions on capacity use (pricing) at the firm level can be based on the
historical cost of capacity if the revenue uncertainty resolves after the capacity
usage decision but not if additional demand information arrives between the
decisions on capacity acquisition and capacity use. However, due to their focus
on decentralization, Dutta and Reichelstein go one step further than the capacity
planning and pricing model and demonstrate that historical capacity cost can
even play an important role for the efficient allocation of capacity in
decentralized firms if they are not relevant for deciding on capacity usage at
the firm level. As shown in Sect. 2.2, the adjustable full cost transfer pricing
mechanism facilitates an efficient decentralization in the fungible capacity
scenario if the division are organized as profit centers. This solution requires that
the transfer price at which the divisions can reserve their initial capacity
endowment equals the historical cost of capacity. Otherwise, the divisions would
have incentives to reserve inefficient capacity levels in the first place. For
example, an ex ante transfer price below the historical cost of capacity (p \ c)
would act as a subsidy and motivate both divisions to overinvest even if
condition (11) holds.
Overall, the results of the Dutta and Reichelstein model suggest that the
historical cost of capacity are an integral part of an efficient capacity
management in multidivisional firms, even in cases where they are not useful
for operational decisions at the firm level. This result is an interesting and novel
contribution to the transfer pricing literature and, more generally, to the full
costing debate.
Table 2 Comparison of optimal decision rules for capacity acquisition and capacity use in the capacity
planning and pricing (CPP) model and the Dutta and Reichelstein (DR) model
Scenario class CPP model DR model
I Uncertainty Dedicated capacity
Capacity use E[MR] = E[OC] Not explicitly modeled
Capacity acquisition HC = E[OC] HC = E[MR]
II Partial uncertainty Fungible capacity
Capacity use/reallocation MR = OC MR = OC
Capacity acquisition HC = E[OC] HC = E[OC]
The table shows the first order conditions for capacity use and capacity acquisition in four different
planning scenarios. MR marginal revenue, OC opportunity cost of capacity, and HC historical cost of
capacity. E[MR] and E[OC] expected marginal revenue and expected opportunity cost, respectively
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3.2 Transfer pricing and organizational form
The analysis of transfer pricing is closely related to the organization of the firm.
Most transfer pricing models assume, implicitly or explicitly, that a decentralized
organization is beneficial and analyze transfer prices as an instrument for
coordinating the decisions of the division managers in the best interest of the
firm.9 For example, the standard transfer pricing model (Hirshleifer 1956) assumes a
profit center structure and recommends transfer prices at marginal cost in order to
implement an efficient level of internal trade between the divisions. This solution
leaves open why the firm actually uses transfer prices for coordinating interdivi-
sional trade. In fact, the firm’s central office must know the optimal transfer quantity
to determine the optimal transfer price so that it could equally regulate the trade
quantity directly instead of using a pricing mechanism for arriving at the same
solution. More fundamentally, the standard transfer pricing model does not provide
a clear economic rationale for decentralization because a centralized firm can also
allocate resources efficiently.10
In line with most recent work that analyzes transfer pricing in terms of an
incomplete contracting problem, Dutta and Reichelstein assume that the need for
decentralization arises from revenue information on the part of the division
managers that is not available to the firm’s headquarters. This assumption seems
generally appropriate but, for the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that
it requires some sort of limited communication between headquarters and divisions
in order to rule out the application of the revelation principle.11
An important feature of the Dutta and Reichelstein model is that it allows to
compare a broader set of responsibility center structures in the context of an
otherwise classical transfer model. So far, only few transfer pricing models have
adopted a similar approach, most of them consider only a single organizational
form. A well known exception is the model of Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1991). They
study the effectiveness of four different organizational forms in the context of a
holdup model, but they do not provide generalizable recommendations on the
optimal responsibility center structure. In the Dutta and Reichelstein model,
organizational choice becomes relevant in the fungible capacity scenario. Here, an
efficient reallocation of the initially reserved capacity levels can be attained through
the proposed adjustable full cost transfer pricing mechanism if the firm adopts one
of the two pure organizational forms. By contrast, Dutta and Reichelstein find that
the hybrid organization suffers from a dynamic holdup problem that arises if the
manager of the downstream division strategically distorts his capacity demand. In
other words, a balanced responsibility center structure seems generally more
desirable than an unbalanced allocation of decision rights.
9 An important exception are strategic transfer pricing models (Go¨x 2000, Narayanan and Smith 2000).
In these models decentralization is key for committing managers to adopt product market strategies that
would not be credible for centralized firms.
10 If there is a competitive market for the intermediate input, the transfer price should equal the market
price (Hirshleifer 1956). However, with this solution there is neither an advantage of internal trade nor a
reason for vertical integration.
11 See e.g. Vaysman (1996) for a detailed analysis of this argument.
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This clear result holds only for linear shadow prices. The ranking of
organizational forms for nonlinear shadow prices is left open and deserves further
consideration. Likewise, it seems promising to investigate factors that might
constitute a preference ordering over the two pure organizational forms. An obvious
advantage of a profit center organization over an investment center structure is the
very fact that the firm’s central office controls the transfer price p at which the
divisions reserve their initial capacity endowments. As shown in Sect. 2.2, this
additional degree of freedom does not help to distinguish the two organizational
forms in the basic version of the Dutta and Reichelstein model because the optimal
transfer price equals the historical capacity cost c. By making the profit center
manager responsible for the full cost of the capacity investments that the firm makes
on his behalf, this solution essentially converts the profit center into an investment
center.
The principal factor distinguishing investment centers from other types of
responsibility centers is the right to make autonomous investment decisions.
Although Dutta and Reichelstein point to technical expertise as a possible reason for
giving authority over the acquisition of capacity resources to the divisions
managers, their model offers no endogenous advantage for establishing an
investment center structure. One path for extending the model into that direction
would be the introduction of asymmetric information regarding the acquisition cost
of capacity. If only the division manager(s) would be able to verify the actual cost of
capacity investments, the decentralization of capacity decisions would offer a
natural advantage over a centralized acquisition of resources. At the same time this
extension would give rise to a potential conflict of interest between headquarters and
divisions and thereby create an interesting trade-off between the two pure
organizational forms under considerations.
4 Selected issues and possible extensions
4.1 Nonlinear shadow prices
An important restriction of the basic model is the linearity of shadow prices. As
shown in Sect. 2.2, the linearity assumption entails the identity of optimal capacities
in the two alternative scenarios and thereby eliminates the potential distortions
arising from the split of the renegotiation surplus in the fungible capacity scenario.
If shadow prices are nonlinear it holds that
bR0it k
d
it
  6¼ E k kot ; et
  
: ð16Þ
Condition (16) implies that the efficient capacity for the fungible capacity scenario
in (10) is different from the optimal capacity in the dedicated capacity scenario in
(4), that is, kot 6¼ kdt : As a consequence, the adjustable full cost mechanism is no
longer sufficient for an efficient decentralization of capacity planning. Dutta and
Reichelstein clearly identify this limitation, but they do not formally analyze
alternative transfer pricing methods or the consequences of nonlinear shadow prices
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on the ranking of organizational forms. The consequences of nonlinear shadow
prices on the divisions’ capacity decisions can be shown by a closer inspection of
the equilibrium conditions for a pure profit center structure in (13). Setting p = c
and evaluating these conditions for the efficient capacity level yields the following
expression for division i
P0it k
o
it; k
o
t
  ¼ ð1  diÞ  E k kot ; et
   bR0it koit
  
; ð17Þ
where kot ¼ ko1t þ ko2t: From (16), the expression in (17) is nonzero unless division i
would be able to capture the entire renegotiation surplus. In fact, if d1 = 1 and
d2 = 0 the equilibrium conditions for division 1 and 2 become
E kðk1t þ k2t; etÞ½  ¼ c and bR02tðk2tÞ ¼ c: ð18Þ
The unique equilibrium capacities solving (18) are k2t ¼ kd2t and k1t ¼ kot  kd2t: That
is, division 2 reserves the optimal quantity for the dedicated capacity scenario and
division 1 adjusts its capacity demand so that in total the optimal capacity kot is
acquired. Intuitively this solution obtains because division 1 becomes the residual
claimant of the firm, whereas division 2 anticipates that it will not participate in the
renegotiation surplus.
For general values of di [ (0, 1), both divisions will underinvest in capacity if
E k kot ; et
  
[ bR0it k
o
it
 
and overinvest otherwise.12 The firm can mitigate this
problem if it modifies the transfer pricing policy. It can be seen from the equilibrium
condition in (13) that an increase of p reduces the capacity demand of division i for
a given capacity demand of division j. Likewise, a reduction of p will provide
incentives for both divisions to increase their capacity demands. The firm’s central
office can build on these effects and use the transfer price to adjust the divisions’
investment incentives.
It can be shown that there exists a transfer price po that induces both divisions to
choose the efficient investment levels. This transfer price is below (above) the
historical capacity acquisition cost if the firm needs to counteract an underinvest-
ment (overinvestment) problem. However, in order to determine the optimal transfer
price, the central office must know the divisional revenue functions. Even if the
firm’s headquarters cannot verify the actual revenues, as it is assumed by Dutta and
Reichelstein, the firm may still be able to calculate the transfer price on the basis of
its expectations about the shape of the revenue function. This approach will
generally not lead to efficient capacity investments, but it is very likely that it
generates higher profits than the adjustable full cost transfer pricing mechanism.
As argued in Sect. 3.2, only a profit center structure allows the firm to adjust the
transfer price for improving the divisions’ investment incentives. By contrast, a pure
investment center organization offers no instrument for avoiding the inefficiency
caused by nonlinear shadow prices. It follows that a pure profit center organization
weakly dominates a pure investment center organization. The former organizational
structure can always replicate the investment incentives provided by the latter by
12 DR show that for a revenue function of the form Rit = eit  Rit(hit, qit) the divisions will overinvest
whenever k(kt, et) is concave in et, and underinvest if k(kt, et) is convex in et.
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setting p = c, but in some cases it can improve the situation by using a transfer price
p = c.
The following example illustrates the consequences of nonlinear shadow prices.
Let division i have a quadratic revenue function Ri ¼ hiqi  0:5eiq2i ; where
ei [ {1, 2} with equal probability.
13 Also, let hi = 300 and c = 45 for computing
numerical solutions. With these assumptions the expected marginal revenue in the
dedicated capacity scenario equals bR0iðkiÞ ¼ 300  1:5  ki: Equating this expression
with cost yields an optimal capacity of kdi ¼ 170 for division i and a total capacity
level of kd ¼ 340:
For the fungible capacity scenario the solution begins with the optimal
reallocation of total capacity k. The constrained profit maximization problem yields
optimal capacity assignments of qi ¼ ei  k=ðe1 þ e2Þ and a shadow price of
k(k, e) = [300  (e1 ? e2) - k  e1  e2]/(e1 ? e2). Since o2kðk; eÞ=oe2i \0; the sha-
dow price is strictly concave in ei. Taking the expectation of the shadow price yields
E[k (k, e)] = 300 - (17/24)  k and an optimal capacity of ko = 360 from
condition (10). It can be seen that ko - kd = 20, that is, the firm installs more
capacity if it can be reallocated after observing e. Substituting the expressions for
the expected shadow price and the expected marginal revenue for the dedicated
capacity scenario into (13) yields the following equilibrium conditions for the
example:
P0iðki; kjÞ ¼ 300  1:5  ki  p þ di 
19  ki  17  kj
24
 	
¼ 0; i; j ¼ 1; 2; i 6¼ j:
ð19Þ
Solving the system of equations in (19) for k1 and k2 and substituting p = c yields
the equilibrium capacity levels for the adjustable full cost mechanism or,
equivalently, for an investment center structure. As argued above, these capacities
will generally be too low. For example, for identical bargaining powers (di = 0.5)
both divisions will reserve a capacity of ki ¼ 174:86: The resulting total capacity of
349.72 lies between the optimal capacities for the dedicated and the fungible
capacity scenario.
With adjustable full cost transfer pricing, efficiency can only be attained if one of
the divisions has all bargaining power. For example, if d1 = 1, division 2 reserves
k2 ¼ 170; division 1 reserves k1 ¼ 190; and the total capacity equals the efficient
level of ko = 360. However, if both divisions can capture a part of the renegotiation
surplus, efficient investment can be induced by setting the transfer price equal to
po = 45 - 30  di  (1 - di). The transfer price is lower than c for di [ (0, 1) in
order to motivate the divisions to increase their capacity demands. It takes a
minimum value of po = 37.5 for identical bargaining powers (di = 0.5). For this
value, both divisions reserve capacities of ki ¼ ko=2: It can also be seen that the
optimal transfer price equals c = 45 for di = 1. Only for this case an initial transfer
at full capacity cost induces efficient capacity investments if shadow prices are
nonlinear.
13 To economize on notation, I consider a representative period and supress the time index.
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The equilibrium in the divisions’ capacity acquisition game for the case of
identical bargaining powers is depicted in Fig. 3. The intersection point between the
two reaction functions k1ðk2; cÞ and k2ðk1; cÞ in point N marks the equilibrium
capacities for a transfer at full cost ki ¼ 174:86
 
: If the firm’s central office
charges a transfer price of po = 37.5, the reaction functions are shifted to the
northeast. The new reaction functions k1 k2; p
oð Þ and k2 k1; poð Þ intersect at the new
equilibrium point E where both divisions reserve exactly half of the efficient
capacity. Finally, the line between E1 and E2 depicts all efficient combinations of k1
and k2. The boundary points are equivalent to the equilibrium points that would
obtain if one of the two divisions had all bargaining power.
4.2 Hybrid organization with fungible capacity
So far, the discussion has focused on the two pure organizational forms. As shown
in Table 1, Dutta and Reichelstein also evaluate the efficiency of a hybrid
organization for the fungible capacity scenario and find that it suffers from a
dynamic holdup problem. This problem arises in the hybrid organization if division
2 anticipates that it might pay to inflate its capacity demand in early periods in order
to obtain a part of the resulting excess capacity in later periods during negotiations.
In the context of the two-period model, the multiperiod objective function of
division 2 is given by the following expression:
),( 2*1 ckk
),( 1*2 ckk
N
),( 1*2 opkk
),( 2*1 opkk
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Fig. 3 Nash equilibrium and optimal transfer pricing in a pure profit center structure. The figure shows
reaction functions ki ðkj; pÞ of division 1 and 2 for transfer price at full cost (p = c) and optimal transfer
price (p = po). Points N and E denote the equilibrium capacities for p = c and for p = po, respectively.
The line connecting points E1 and E2 shows all efficient combinations of k1 and k2. Plot generated for
Ri ¼ 300  qi  0:5  ei  q2i ; ei 2 f1; 2g with equal probability, and c = 45
Discussion of Dutta & Reichelstein 495
123
P2 ¼ u21  P21 þ u22  P22; ð20Þ
where P2t is defined in Eq. (12). Dutta and Reichelstein argue that division 1 will
find it ‘‘particularly profitable’’ to exaggerate its capacity demand in period 2 if
u22 [ u21. The argument is intuitively appealing. As a profit center division 2 pays a
price of p for each unit of excess capacity that it initially reserves. The ex ante cost
incurred in period 1 must be overcompensated by the expected benefits realized in
period 2. Since u22 and u21 can take arbitrary values, it is always possible to identify
conditions, where this condition is met.
Interestingly, the hybrid organization can even provide incentives for strategic
capacity planning in the context of a single period model where varying time
preferences play no role by definition. The reason is that the hybrid organization
changes the order of moves in the simultaneous capacity acquisition game and
converts it into a sequential game. In the sequential game division 2 de facto
becomes the Stackelberg leader. It reserves capacity k2 before division 1 follows
and acquires the total amount of capacity required by the two divisions. To elaborate
on the consequences of this change, suppose that the firm plans only for a single
period. With fungible capacity, the performance measure of division 1 in (6)
becomes
P1 ¼ bR1ðk1Þ þ p  k2  c  ðk1 þ k2Þ þ d1  SPðkÞ: ð21Þ
Maximizing the expression in (21) with respect to k1 implicitly defines the optimal
capacity of division 1 as a function of k2. Solving the resulting first order condition
for k1 yields the reaction function k

1ðk2Þ that specifies the best response of division
1 to a given capacity demand of division 2. Plugging the reaction function into the
profit function of division 2 and maximizing the resulting expression with respect to
k2 yields the following condition for the optimal capacity choice of division 2:
dP2 k2; k1ðk2Þ
 
dk2
¼ oP2
ok2
þ d2  E k kðk2Þ; eð Þ½   bR01 k1ðk2Þ
 h i  dk1
dk2
¼ 0; ð22Þ
where kðk2Þ ¼ k1ðk2Þ þ k2: The last definition shows that division 2 essentially
determines the total capacity of the firm. The expression in (22) comprises two
terms. The term oP2=ok2  P02 k2; kðk2Þð Þ captures the direct effect of marginally
increasing k2 on the profit of division 2. It is equivalent to the expression in the
simultaneous move game in (13). The second term captures the first mover
advantage. It comprises the marginal change in the profit of division 2 due to the
reaction of division 1 on a marginal change of k2. To determine the consequences of
the strategic effect on the divisions’ capacity choices, it is helpful to evaluate the
optimality condition in (22) for the efficient capacity level and a transfer price at full
cost.
Observe first that P02 k
o
2; k
o
  ¼ 0 for p = c whenever the shadow price is linear e.
Moreover, linearity implies that E k ko; eð Þ½  ¼ bR01 ko1
 
so that the strategic effect is
also zero. It follows that the change in the order of moves does not impact the
equilibrium outcome of the one period capacity game whenever the linearity
condition in (11) is met. As shown in the previous section, P02 k
o
2; k
o
 
is nonzero if
the shadow price is nonlinear in e. In the profit center setting this fact motivates
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division 2 to secure too little capacity if E k ko; eð Þ½ [ bR0i koi
 
and to reserve too
much capacity otherwise. Since dk1/dk2 \ 0, the strategic effect works into the same
direction and reinforces the underinvestment problem caused by the violation of the
linearity assumption. However, since division 2 is a profit center, the firm’s central
office can control its capacity demand by varying p. As for the pure profit center
structure, there always exists a transfer price po that induces division 2 to reserve the
efficient capacity level. Since the capacity decision of division 2 is biased in the
same direction, po is below (above) full cost if division 2 reserves too little (too
much) capacity.
To illustrate the argument, I continue the parametric example from Sect. 4.1
assuming identical bargaining powers. Figure 4 shows the potential equilibria in the
divisions’ capacity acquisition game. As in Fig. 3, the efficient capacity frontier is
depicted by the line connecting E1 and E2, whereas the Nash equilibrium for a
transfer price at full cost is marked by the intersection point N between the reaction
functions k1ðk2Þ and k2ðk1Þ: The Stackelberg equilibrium for the hybrid organization
and a transfer price of p = c is depicted by the tangency point S between the
isoprofit curve of division 2, P2ðk1; k2; cÞ; and the reaction function of division 1.
In the Stackelberg equilibrium division 2 reserves less capacity ks2 ¼ 172:06
 
;
and division 1 reserves slightly more capacity ks1 ¼ 175:75
 
than in the Nash
equilibrium ki ¼ 174:86
 
: Since the decrease in capacity demand of division 2
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Fig. 4 Stackelberg equilibrium and optimal transfer pricing in a hybrid organization. The figure shows
reaction functions ki ðkjÞ of division 1 and 2. P2ðk1; k2; pÞ are isoprofit curves for division 2 and a transfer
price p. Point N depicts the Nash equilibrium for p = c. The line connecting points E1 and E2 shows all
efficient combinations of k1 and k2. The tangency point S between P2ðk1; k2; cÞ and the reaction function
of division 1 denotes the Stackelberg equilibrium for p = c. Point E1 is the tangency point between
P2ðk1; k2; poÞ and the reaction function of division 1. It marks the Stackelberg equilibrium for p = po.
Plot generated for Ri ¼ 300  qi  0:5  ei  q2i ; ei 2 f1; 2g with equal probability, and c = 45
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exceeds the increase in capacity demand of division 1, total capacity drops from
k* = 349.72 to k*s = 347.81. The example shows that the hybrid organization can
exacerbate the underinvestment problem if shadow prices are nonlinear and the
transfer price is at full cost.14
In the example, the central office can mitigate the problem if it sets a transfer price
below full cost. Doing so shifts the isoprofit curve of division 2 to the northwest.15
The optimal transfer price equals po = 45 - 30  (1 - d2). This expression is
increasing in the bargaining power of division 2 and equals po = 30 for identical
bargaining powers. The new equilibrium for p = po is depicted by the tangency point
E1 between the isoprofit curve of division 2, P2 k1; k2; poð Þ; and the reaction function
of division 1. The resulting solution is efficient, that is, ks1 þ ks2 ¼ ko:
The example confirms that the pure organizational forms dominate a hybrid
organization if shadow prices are nonlinear and the firm sets its transfer prices on the
basis of full cost. However, since the hybrid organization allows firms to mitigate the
inefficiency caused by nonlinear shadow prices by adjusting the transfer price, it
offers a clear advantage over an investment center structure where this option does
not exist. Evidently, this argument is based on the results of a single period model
with perfect information. However, the example shows that the ranking of
organizational forms with nonlinear shadow prices is a nontrivial problem that
deserves further consideration. Addressing this issue in the context of a multiperiod
model with a richer set of transfer pricing methods is certainly promising.
4.3 Different capacity types and slack capacity
As explained in Sect. 2.1, the Dutta and Reichelstein model assumes that capacity is
perfectly divisible and always fully utilized. These conditions significantly simplify
the analysis of the multiperiod capacity planning problem, but they are not self-
evident and require further discussion. A nontrivial capacity planning problem
requires that some of the firm’s resources cause costs that are fixed in the short run.
Fixed capacity cost can arise for two reasons. First, the acquisition of capacity
usually involves a long term commitment of resources and, second, the capacity
resources can be indivisible (Luhmer 1992). As shown in Table 3, the combination
of the two resource characteristics allows to distinguish four different resources
types.
The first class of resources is perfectly divisible and immediately available as
needed for production. These resources, such as materials or workers paid on a
piece-rate basis, are not considered as capacities. Most capacity planning models
including Dutta and Reichelstein and the capacity planning and pricing model
discussed in Sect. 3.1 assume that the resources are perfectly divisible but
14 The fact that the hybrid organization exacerbates the underinvestment problem can also be verified by
comparing the orthogonal distances between the efficient capacity frontier and the equilibrium points N
and S. In fact, this distance is larger for point S than for point N.
15 A comparison of Figs. 3 and 4 shows that the procedure for implementing a new equilibrium via
transfer pricing in a sequential game is different from the procedure for a simultaneous game. As shown
in Fig. 3, the latter is based on a shift of reaction functions, while the former moves the tangency point
between the reaction function of division 1 and the isoprofit curve of division 2.
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committed for a longer period. A natural example are permanent labor contracts.
The cost of these resources is variable at the time of capacity planning but fixed
once the capacity decision has been taken. Since capacity is perfectly scalable, the
total acquisition cost can be traced to a single capacity unit and the per unit cost of
capacity can be identified without ambiguity.
This attribute gets lost if resources are indivisible. Consider, for example, the
acquisition of a patent for pharmaceuticals or an exclusive selling license and
suppose that the seller demands a fixed annual fee. If the contract permits the buyer
to market the respective product but does not relate the fee to the sales figures there
is no link between the sales quantity and the cost of capacity. Moreover, if the
potential market size is unknown, it is also impossible to determine a reliable
measure for the acquisition cost per unit of the theoretical market capacity.
Frequently, the acquisition of indivisible resources also involves long-term
commitments. Under these conditions it is often hard to provide a theoretical
justification for the allocation of the investment expenses to the single periods of the
planning horizon. For example, if a firm buys a patent with a duration of multiple
years but makes only one lump sum payment when signing the contract, it is
impossible to relate the expenses in a meaningful manner to the sales quantities in
single periods.
In practice, full costing typically involves the allocation of fixed costs caused by
indivisible resources. By contrast, the capacity planning literature has almost
exclusively focused on the relevance of perfectly divisible but committed resources.
These resources are certainly important, but it remains an open question if unit cost
measures derived from allocating the cost of indivisible resources can be helpful for
facilitating capacity planning and capacity usage decisions.
By contrast, most theoretical studies allow for unused capacity resources (Van
Mieghem 2003). Although firms in growing industries may indeed operate at full
capacity for some years, there are many examples for firms that carry huge amounts
of excess capacity because of unanticipated declines in demand, such as the
automotive industry in the United States. It is therefore interesting to see if the
structural insights of the Dutta and Reichelstein model would change if the firm
could carry unused capacity. Answering this question would require a more detailed
analysis of capacity use. Currently, capacity use is not explicitly modeled but
implicitly incorporated in the reduced form revenue function.
In fact, this approach is not too restrictive because the capacity planning and
pricing model discussed in Sect. 3.1 shows that a more detailed analysis of capacity
planning and capacity use leads to similar reduced form profit functions at the
capacity planning stage. The main difference between the two approaches lies in the
Table 3 Resource and cost types
Resource type Divisible Indivisible
Flexible Variable cost Fixed cost (not traceable)
Commited Fixed cost (traceable) Fixed cost (not traceable)
Adapted from Luhmer (1992)
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fact that the capacity constraint does not bind for some realizations of the noise term
et. Let X denote the set of realizations for which the product demand is lower than
capacity and let X define its complement. Clearly, the maximum revenue Rit does
not depend on kt, and the shadow price of capacity is zero for all et 2 X:
Accordingly, the maximum revenue of division i in period t must be redefined and
becomes
bRit ¼ Eet jet2X Riðqitðkt; etÞ; eitÞ½  þ Eet jet2X RiðqitðeitÞ; eitÞ½ : ð23Þ
This expression is still a function of kt. Likewise, the expected opportunity cost
becomes Eet jet2X½kðkt; etÞ; but this modification does not change the structure of the
optimality condition in (10) although the optimal capacity will generally be
different.16 I conclude that the structural insights of the Dutta and Reichelstein
model remain valid even if the capacity constraint does not always bind.
5 Summary and conclusions
Dutta and Reichelstein provide a rich and interesting study of the interplay between
transfer pricing and organizational form in providing incentives for efficient
capacity management in decentralized firms. Their analysis yields two important
findings. First, transfer prices based on the historical cost of capacity can be a useful
instrument for implementing efficient capacity decisions in decentralized organi-
zations. Second, symmetric responsibility structures are generally better suited for
providing efficient investment incentives than hybrid organizations.
The key prerequisite for establishing these results is the efficiency of the
adjustable full cost transfer pricing mechanism in the fungible capacity scenario.
Dutta and Reichelstein clearly state that this condition is only met if the shadow
price of capacity is a linear function of the noise terms in the divisions’ revenue
function, but they do not explore the consequences of this restriction on the optimal
transfer price and the ranking of organizational forms.
My analysis in Sects. 4.1 and 4.2 yields two additional insights for a world in
which the shadow prices of capacity are nonlinear. First of all, the negotiated
transfer pricing mechanism is still essential for implementing efficient capacity
decisions, but it is no longer optimal to base the initial transfer price on full cost. In
fact, it is usually better to use a transfer price below (above) the historical cost of
capacity in order to counteract the managers’ incentives to underinvest (overinvest).
Second, since the transfer price becomes an important instrument for mitigating the
inefficiency caused by nonlinear shadow prices, profit center organizations are
generally more appropriate for motivating the managers to acquire the efficient
capacity levels than investment center organizations. The additional degree of
freedom in guiding the managers’ capacity decision can even make a hybrid
organization more desirable than a pure investment center structure. However, this
16 In fact, an equivalent optimality condition for the capacity planning stage can be found in the model of
Go¨x (2002), Eq. (44) that allows for unused capacity.
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argument is based on the analysis of a simple single period model with perfect
information and cannot be generalized.
More fundamentally, this discussion shows that the curvature of profit functions
can have an important impact on optimal transfer pricing and organizational design.
This observation is an important by-product of the Dutta and Reichelstein model
that significantly increases the complexity of transfer pricing models and clearly
deserves further consideration. Addressing this issue in the context of a multiperiod
model with a richer set of transfer pricing methods is certainly a promising objective
for future research in the area of transfer pricing.
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